SCION: Scalability, Control, and Isolation On Next-Generation Networks
Event details
| Date | 24.06.2011 |
| Hour | 16:15 |
| Speaker | Prof. Adrian Perrig, Carnegie Mellon University |
| Location | |
| Category | Conferences - Seminars |
We present the first Internet architecture designed to provide route
control, failure isolation, and explicit trust information for
end-to-end communications. SCION separates ASes into groups of
independent routing sub-planes, called trust domains, which then
interconnect to form complete routes. Trust domains provide natural
isolation of routing failures and human misconfiguration, give
endpoints strong control for both inbound and outbound traffic,
provide meaningful and enforceable trust, and enable scalable routing
updates with high path freshness. As a result, our architecture
provides strong resilience and security properties as an intrinsic
consequence of good design principles, avoiding piecemeal add-on
protocols as security patches. Meanwhile, SCION only assumes that a
few top-tier ISPs in the trust domain are trusted for providing
reliable end-to-end communications, thus achieving a small Trusted
Computing Base. Both our security analysis and evaluation results
show that SCION naturally prevents numerous attacks and provides a
high level of resilience, scalability, control, and isolation. Prof. Perrig's homepage
Practical information
- General public
- Free